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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario:' The police conduct an under-
cover sting operation targeting drug traffickers. An undercover officer
approaches a suspected drug dealer and arranges to purchase crack
cocaine. Over a period of five weeks, the suspect makes seven sales to
1. See, for example, United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055 (D.Minn. 1992).
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the officer, and the police arrest him after the final sale. The total
amount sold by the defendant was 50.4 grams, just enough to place
him within the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.2 Had he
sold up to 49.9 grams, his mandatory minimum sentence would only
have been five years. The district court hearing this case found it "not
at all fortuitous" that the agent arrested the defendant only after the
agent "had arranged enough successive buys to reach the magic
number.'3 Is this fair? The district court in United States v. Barth
did not think so.4
Under the old sentencing system, discretion over sentencing
resided with judges.5 With the adoption of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), sentencing discretion has, in effect,
shifted from judges to prosecutors and even tolaw enforcement field
agents. 6 The agents, with little supervision, can negotiate for any
amount of drugs they choose, and this amount will determine the
defendant's drug sentence.7
Courts have developed the "sentence entrapment" doctrine to
combat this kind of manipulation.8 Until recently, sentence entrap-
ment existed largely in theory, but with the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Staufer, the sentence entrapment claim has
become a reality9
While the general theory of entrapment has a long history, 10
courts perceived a need for sentence entrapment only after the en-
actment of the Guidelines." The Guidelines mark an enormous shift
in the goals and methods of criminal sentencing. These changes have
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994 ed.).
3. Barth, 788 F. Supp. at 1057.
4. Id. at 1057-58 (holding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines artificially inflated the
defendant's culpability and that the circumstances of the drug purchases constituted a
mitigating factor in sentencing). However, this decision was overturned on appeal. United
States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993).
5. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106-1107 (9th Cir. 1994). See also United
States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is by now apodictic that the sen-
tencing guidelines effectively stunt the wide discretion which district judges formerly enjoyed in
criminal sentencing").
6. See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107-1108 (comparing the previous sentencing system, under
which courts could use their discretion to prevent governmental abuse, to the current system in
which courts have diminished discretion).
7. Id.
8. For the first court of appeals case to discuss the claim of sentence entrapment, see
United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) ("We are not prepared to say there
is no such animal as 'sentencing entrapment' ").
9. 38 F.3d at 1108 ('We are persuaded that 'sentencing entrapment' may be legally relied
upon to depart under the Sentencing Guidelines").
10. See, for example, Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Sorrells was the first
supreme court case holding in favor of the entrapment theory.
11. Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1106-07.
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created the potential for governmental abuse and manipulation of
sentencing.12
This Note examines sentence entrapment against the
background of supreme court entrapment jurisprudence. Part II
introduces the Staufer decision and the Ninth Circuit's version of the
sentence entrapment defense. Part III discusses the history of the
Guidelines and how they lead to governmental manipulation of
sentencing. Part IV reviews supreme court entrapment jurispru-
dence. Part V discusses the various theoretical approaches taken by
the circuits in addressing sentence entrapment. Part VI analyzes
these different theories of sentence entrapment in the context of the
Supreme Court's general entrapment jurisprudence and proposes a
theoretically sound and practical approach to sentence entrapment.
Part VII discusses the role of this proposed version of sentence en-
trapment in light of other possible solutions to the problem of gov-
ernmental manipulation of sentencing.
II. THE STAUFER DECISION AND THE ADOPTION OF SENTENCE
ENTRAPMENT AS A BASIS FOR DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINES
In United States v. Staufer, Mark Staufer was convicted of
possession of LSD 13 with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 151
months in prison and five years probation. 14 On appeal the Ninth
Circuit held that a departure from the Guidelines-mandated sentence
was warranted based on sentence entrapment.' 5
In August of 1992, an acquaintance introduced Staufer to an
undercover agent who was posing as someone interested in purchas-
ing LSD.16 Unbeknownst to Staufer, his acquaintance was a confiden-
tial informant and a convicted felon who was assisting the govern-
ment in order to reduce his own ten-year sentence.'7 Acting with no
supervision by the government, the informant contacted Staufer con-
stantly in an effort to persuade him to sell drugs.18 In fact, the agent
called Staufer so often at work that Staufer's supervisor became upset
12. See notes 83-105 and accompanying text.
13. Lysergic diethylamide acid.
14. 38 F.3d at 1104.
15. Id. at 1108.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1105.
18. Id.
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with him for spending too much time on the telephone. 19 At the time
of the sting operation, Staufer had no money to his name.20 He lived
in a garage because he was unable to pay rent and had numerous out-
standing bills.21 He had recently been robbed, beaten, and
hospitalized. 22 Under these conditions he was finally induced to sell.23
At the meeting, Staufer had only wanted to sell 5,000 doses of
LSD, but the agent insisted instead that Staufer provide 10,000
doses.24 When Staufer displayed reluctance, the agent immediately
offered more money.25 At trial the only evidence of previous drug
sales was one instance in which Staufer had bought fifteen dollars
worth of LSD and had given some to friends for eight dollars.26
The Ninth Circuit held that the government had entrapped
Staufer by convincing him to sell a quantity of drugs in excess of what
he was predisposed to sell.27 The court held that sentence entrapment
occurs when a defendant who is otherwise predisposed to commit a
minor or lesser offense is entrapped into committing a greater offense
subject to more severe punishment.2s In so holding, the court
observed that a recent amendment to the Guidelines allowed
departure from the Guidelines under similar circumstances. 29 Under
this amendment, a court can depart from the Guideline sentence if, in
an undercover operation, the government agent sold drugs at a price
significantly below market value, thereby causing the suspect to
purchase more than his available resources would otherwise allow.
The court inferred from this amendment that the Sentencing
Commission recognized the policy that government agents should not
be able to structure undercover operations to maximize sentences.30
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1108.
28. Id. at 1106.
29. Id. at 1107 (citing Amend. Application Note to § 2D1.1, 486). The amendment states
the following:
If in a reverse sting [operation], . . . the court finds that the government agent set a
price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the
controlled substance, thereby leading to the defendant's purchase of a significantly
greater quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would have al-
lowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by the government agent,
a downward departure may be warranted.
30. Id.
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Therefore, the court held that a departure from the Guideline
sentence was warranted in this case, based on entrapment.31
The Staufer court explained that the Guidelines have led
courts around the country to rethink the rule of entrapment.32 The
court noted that prior to the Guidelines, judges could exercise their
discretion in sentencing and ensure that defendants' prison terms did
not exceed their culpability.33 Under the Guidelines, however, judges
no longer exercise this discretion, and the entrapment doctrine
designed for the old system cannot protect against manipulation of
sentencing in the new system.34 Therefore, to combat manipulation of
sentencing and to better tailor sentences to culpability, the court
adopted the doctrine of sentence entrapment.35
III. SENTENCING AND THE GUIDELINES
A. Before the Guidelines: Disparity, Uncertainty, and Judicial
Discretion
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (the
"Act").38 The Act established the Federal Sentencing Commission (the
"Commission"), which then promulgated the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.37 The Guidelines went into effect in 1987.
In the pre-Guidelines federal system, disparity in sentencing
was the norm.38 Disparity in sentencing is a problem with two
components: lack of uniformity and lack of proportionality.39 With a
lack of uniformity, those who commit the same crime and are equally
culpable receive different sentences. With a lack of proportionality,
defendants of different culpabilities receive the same sentence. Lack
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1106.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1107.
35. Id. at 1107-08.
36. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1994 ed.).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994 ed.).
38. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1972) (stating
that "nobody doubts that essentially similar people in large numbers receive widely divergent
sentences for essentially similar or identical crimes").
39. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 883, 932-34 (1990) (discussing the two strands of
disparity-uniformity versus proportionality).
1996]
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of uniformity was the predominant problem in pre-Guidelines
sentencing and led to great disparity in sentences. 40  Lack of
uniformity produced sentences ranging from three to twenty years
imprisonment for identical cases in the Second Circuit.41 Lack of
uniformity also resulted in factors totally unrelated to culpability,
such as the region of conviction and the race and sex of the defendant,
having a large effect on sentencing.42 Conviction in the South resulted
in sentences approximately six months longer than average while
conviction in central California led to sentences twelve months
shorter.43 Female bank robbers were likely to serve six months less
than similarly situated males, and black bank robbers convicted in
the South were likely to serve thirteen months more than similarly
situated bank robbers convicted in other regions. 44
Pre-Guidelines sentencing was also characterized by uncer-
tainty. Since the Parole Commission controlled when a prisoner
would be released, the sentence imposed by a judge was not the actual
amount of time a defendant would serve.45 Under the pre-Guidelines
system, a judge might sentence a defendant to twelve years, but the
Parole Commission could release him after four.46 Since release by
the Parole Commission was probable but not inevitable, this system
misled both judges and defendants. 47 Uncertainty in sentencing
exacerbated the problem of disparity as some judges tried to calibrate
their sentences to what they guessed the Parole Commission would
do, while others ignored the effects of parole.48
40. See Ilene H. Nagel, Stephen Breyer and Terence MacCarthy, Equality Versus
Discretion in Sentencing, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1813, 1813-14 (1989) (introduction by Frank H.
Easterbrook) (describing past practices of judges).
41. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 5 (1988) (citing A. Partridge and W. Eldgridge, The
Second Circuit Sentencing Study: A Report to the Judges 1-3 (Federal Judicial Center, 1974)).
42. See Sentencing Guidelines, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 665, 675-77 (1987) (statement of
Ilene H. Nagel, Commissioner, Sentencing Commission).
43. Id. at 676.
44. Id. at 676-77.
45. Bruce M. Selya and Matthew Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (1991).
46. Breyer, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 41).
47. Id. See Nagel, Breyer and MacCarthy, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 1816 (cited in note 40)
("In addition to unwarranted disparity, sentence pronouncements were misleading;, a twelve
year term of imprisonment meant four years in most instances, but only the victim, his family,
and the public were duped. Because of this systemic sham, each player in the criminal justice
system second-guessed the next, with no one recommending a sentence thought to be appropri-
ate to the offense').
48. See Breyer, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 41).
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In the pre-Guidelines system, judges had the discretion to
select a punishment within broad statutory limits. Congress provided
only a broad sentencing range, sometimes between zero and twenty-
five years.49 The judge was not told whether to start at the bottom of
the range and work up, start at the top and work down, or start
somewhere in the middle. 0 He was not told which factors were rele-
vant in sentencing, whether these factors should mitigate or enhance
a sentence,51 or even which sentencing goals should inform his deci-
sions.52 Under this system, the judge was not obligated to give rea-
sons for the sentence, and sentences were rarely appealable. 53 If a
sentence was appealed, it would most likely be upheld.54 Judge
Marvin Frankel commented that this system was "by and large a bi-
zarre 'non system' of extravagant powers. ' 5
B. The Guidelines: An Attempt to Solve the Problem
In enacting sentencing reform legislation, Congress sought to
address the two major problems in the pre-Guidelines system, uncer-
49. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 901 (1991).
50. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L. J. 1681, 1687-88 (1992).
51. See Frankel, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 38) (commenting that some courts
may treat a guilty plea as a mitigating factor because it saves the public the trouble of a jury).
52. See Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1688 (cited in note 50) (stating that judges often disagreed
regarding which of the four goals of sentencing should be followed: incapacitation,
rehabilitation, deterrence, or punishment). See also Frankel, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 5 (cited in
note 38) (noting that nothing tells judges which sentencing goals should be followed nor how to
sort out conflicts between opposing sentencing goals).
53. Freed, 101 Yale L. J. at 1688 (cited in note 50). See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443, 447 (1972) (stating that "a sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory
limits, is generally not subject to review").
54. See, for example, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). The Williams Court held
that the sentencing judge could consider the defendant's prior criminal record without
permitting witness confrontation on the subject. Id. at 252. The dissent argued against
imposition of the death penalty stating that the court had relied on "a probation report,
consisting almost entirely of evidence that would have been inadmissible at the trial. Some,
such as allegations of prior crimes, was irrelevant. Much was incompetent as hearsay. All was
damaging, and none was subject to scrutiny by the defendant." Id. at 253 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
55. Frankel, 41 U. Cin L. Rev. at 2 (cited in note 38) (stating that "the sentencing stage
has come to strike me as the key focus of disease in our apparatus of punishment"). See Sanford
H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
904, 916 (1962) (noting that "the new penology has resulted in vesting in judges and parole and
probation agencies the greatest degree of uncontrolled power over the liberty of human beings
that one can find in the legal system").
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tainty and disparity.56 To lessen the uncertainty of sentences,
Congress abolished the Parole Commission.57 Now, except for small
deductions for good behavior, a defendant serves the full sentence
handed down by the judge.58 To decrease disparity in sentencing,
Congress created the Federal Sentencing Commission, which pro-
duced the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.59
The Guidelines moved sentencing from an indeterminate sys-
tem based on judicial discretion to a determinate one that tells the
court which factors to consider in sentencing and how much weight to
place upon each factor. The Guidelines are based on a grid with one
axis corresponding to the charged offense and the other axis
corresponding the criminal history of the defendant. 60 The judge
follows the grid to the appropriate sentence-the more serious the
offense and the longer the criminal history, the more severe the
sentence. If the judge finds that any of the specified mitigating or
enhancing factors are present, he adjusts the sentence up or down as
the Guidelines demand. He then arrives at a narrow sentencing
range from within which he must choose the sentence.61
The Guidelines provide that a judge can depart from this
sentencing range, but only if there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that was not adequately taken into account by the
Commission in formulating the Guidelines and that should result in a
sentence different from that prescribed. 62  These departures are
subject to appellate review for reasonableness.63 Though the
Guidelines seem to suggest a permissive attitude toward departure,64
the courts of appeals have been very restrictive and have held the
trial courts to the Guidelines-mandated sentence even in the most
compelling of circumstances. 65
The central compromise made by the Commission in creating
the Guidelines was over the range of information that would be
56. Breyer, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 41).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at5.
60. Selya and Kipp, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 6 (cited in note 45).
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(e)(3), (f)(2).
64. See, Alschuler, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 910 (cited in note 49) (noting that Judge Leval
found that the Guidelines did not attempt to constrain substantially the power of judges to
depart).
65. Id. at 910-11. See, for example, United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 508 (6th Cir.
1990) (holding that the defendant's responsibility to care for small children did not justify
departure); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant's
mental illness did not justify departure).
204 [Vol. 49:197
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considered at sentencing.66 In other words, should the judge consider
all the circumstances surrounding the crime and the whole personal
history of the defendant, or should the judge merely focus on the
charged crime and give identical sentences to all those who commit
the same statutory violation?67
Confronted with this difficult choice, the Commission compro-
mised and adopted Guidelines that focus both on the charge and the
circumstances surrounding the crime. According to Judge (now
Justice) Breyer, the Commission attempted to codify the average
sentencing practices that existed before the Guidelines.68
Notwithstanding this effort to conform to past practices, the
Guidelines seem to represent a shift in the goals of sentencing from
rehabilitation to retribution or 'Just deserts.69 This change in values
is reflected in the emphasis the Guidelines place on harm to society
rather than on the characteristics of the defendant that make him
more or less amenable to reform.70 One commentator has noted that a
rationale emphasizing "proportionality and desert" should place the
primary emphasis on the seriousness of the offender's present crime."1
The Guidelines have taken this view to heart by making harm
to society the determinative factor in sentencing. For example, the
66. Breyer, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 13 (cited in note 41).
67. See id. at 8-14. Breyer discusses the compromise made by the Commission regarding
procedural versus substantive justice. Id. A sentencing system that focuses on procedural
fairness allows the court to consider only evidence that satisfies strict procedural rules. Id. at 9.
However, this type of a system will tend to treat people who commit the same statutory
violation in the same way even though the crimes may in fact be very different. Id. Thus, a
bank robber may take a lot or a little money, use or not use a gun, or injure or not injure the
teller, yet under such a system all bank robbers will tend to be lumped together. Id. at 9-10.
A sentencing system that focuses on substantive fairness will attempt to sentence for what
"really" happened. Id. at 10. This will result in individualized sentences but will necessitate
that in sentencing, the court will be able to view evidence that has not been tested by the
procedural rules designed to protect the defendant. Id. at 10-11. If the court did subject all the
evidence in sentencing to trial procedures, the court would be overwhelmed by the task and the
system would become administratively unworkable. Id. at 11.
68. Id.
69. See Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines'Failure to Eliminate
Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 187, 187
(1993).
70. Alschuler, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 908-909 (cited in note 49) (stating that the Guidelines'
grid approach to sentencing "has yielded a profound and disturbing change in penal philosophy.
It has led to the substitution of crime tariffs for the consideration of situational and offender
characteristics in even simple and recurring cases. The focus has been on harms, not people").
71. Andrew von Hirsch, Guidance by Numbers or Words? Numerical Versus Narrative
Guidelines for Sentencing, in Martin Wasik and Ken Pease, eds., Sentencing Reform: Guidance
or Guidelines? 46, 49 (Manchester, 1987). But see Alschuler, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev at 909 (cited in
note 49) (disagreeing with this statement by von Hirsch and characterizing it as a "self-evident
falsehood").
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Guidelines use quantity, such as the amount of money laundered or
the amount of drugs sold, as an approximation of the harm to society
and the danger posed by the defendant.7 2 Particularly in drug crimes,
quantity drives sentencing.73 Because the quantity-determined start-
ing point in drug sentences is very high, prosecutors and judges often
refrain from imposing enhancements for aggravating factors because
they believe the resulting sentence would be far too harsh.74 Because
Congress has created mandatory minimum sentences based on drug
quantity, the sentencing floor is often set by quantity as well.
Therefore, drug quantity becomes not just the most important sen-
tencing factor, but in effect the only factor.75
C. After the Guidelines: Disparity and Governmental Manipulation
By focusing on quantity, the Guidelines have made progress
against one of the twin components of disparity, lack of uniformity.
However, focusing on quantity has exacerbated the other component
of disparity, lack of proportionality. In fact, Commissioner Ilene
Nagel admits that in creating the Guidelines the Sentencing
Commission was more concerned with uniformity-making sentences
alike, than with proportionality-insuring the likeness of those
grouped together for similar sentences.76  The Guidelines' focus on
quantity has led to a decrease in proportionality of sentences in at
least two ways.
First, for low level drug offenders, quantity does not accurately
reflect culpability.7 The Guidelines prescribe sentences with the
belief that quantity of drugs reflects a defendant's position in the drug
hierarchy.78 Quantity can show the defendant's trust within the drug
72. See David Yelen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 403, 451-453 (1993).
73. Id. See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The
Problem is Uniformity, not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833, 853-854 (1992) (noting that
under the Guidelines distributing 5 kilos of cocaine gets 121 to 151 months incarceration, 50
kilos gets 188 to 235 months, 150 kilos gets 235 to 293 months, and 1500 kilos gets 30 years to
life).
74. Id. at 854.
75. Id.
76. Nagel, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 934 (cited in note 39). See Alschuler, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 909-10 (cited in note 49) (arguing that the problem with the Guidelines is not
lack of uniformity but too much aggregation-treating different defendants the same).
77. See generally Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's Drug Guidelines: Courier
Cases where Quantity Overstates Culpability, 3 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 63 (1990) (criticizing the
Guidelines and quantity-based penalties for disproportionate severity toward lower level drug
offenders).
78. See id. at 63 (noting that the quantity-based sentencing guidelines often apply to
defendants less culpable than the kingpins who are the "primary targets of the law").
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ring or it can show the amount of money he expects to make from the
transaction.7 9  Often, however, for couriers and other low level par-
ticipants, quantity is a poor measure of culpability.80 For self-protec-
tion, drug producers hire couriers who have limited contact with the
organization.81 Often, the courier does not know the quantity or even
the type of drugs he is carrying, yet he is charged with the same crime
as the supplier. Because quantity determines the sentence, the low
level courier who happens to be transporting a large amount of drugs
will be sentenced as if he were a drug kingpin.8 2
The second factor causing a lack of proportionality8 and, there-
fore, disparity is the manipulation of undercover sting operations84
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at64.
82. See id. at 64-65 (arguing that the low level offender is further disadvantaged under
the Guidelines because the court will be less likely to depart downward). Under the Guidelines,
the court may depart downward for cooperation, but only if the defendant provides substantial
assistance, meaning that the information the defendant provides must have real value in the
investigation of another case. Id. A low level drug courier who was purposely chosen for the job
because of his lack of knowledge of the drug organization will have little valuable information to
offer the prosecution and, therefore, little chance of receiving a departure. Id. In this way, the
drug courier may receive a heavier sentence than the more culpable kingpin who has
information to offer.
83. Another source of disparity that has received much attention from commentators and
courts is the Guidelines' shift in sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors. See, for
example, Robert E. Underhill, Sentence Entrapment: A Casualty of the War on Crime, 1994
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 165, 166 (discussing problems arising in sting operations as a result of the
shift from judicial to prosecutorial sentencing discretion). Judges' hands are tied by the
determinate sentencing structure of the Guidelines, but prosecutors are free to choose the
charge and to decide which facts to allege at sentencing, which may mitigate or enhance the
sentence. See United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964-69 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
Judge Harry Edwards presents an example of how large an effect the exercise of the
prosecution's newfound discretion over sentencing can have over a defendant's sentence:
Consider the case of a defendant who is charged with possessing ten grams of crack co-
caine with intent to distribute-an offense carrying a Guideline sentence of 63-78
months for a defendant with no criminal record, and a mandatory minimum sentence of
five years. If the prosecutor elects to add a weapons charge in connection with the drug
offense, the Guideline range goes to 78-97 months and the mandatory minimum rises to
ten years. The prosecutor also may choose to assert certain subsidiary facts which will
affect the sentence, such as committing the offense at or near a school, or distributing to
a minor-both of which add at least two offense levels (a minimum enhancement of 19
months in my hypothetical).
Id. at 964-65. Based upon this hypothetical, Judge Edwards drew the following conclusion:
Instead of eliminating sentencing discretion and subjectivity, the Guidelines merely
transferred it from district judges-who, whatever their perceived failings, are at least
impartial arbiters who make their decisions on the record and subject to public scrutiny
and appellate review-to less neutral parties who rarely are called to account for the
discretion they wield. Thus, the 'discretion and disparity game continues; it is only the
players who have changed.
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Since quantity drives sentencing under the Guidelines, prosecutors
and undercover field agents can manipulate the likely sentence by
selecting the quantity of contraband to be proposed in the undercover
transaction8 5 They can select a longer sentence by suggesting more
contraband. Prosecutors have broad authority to guide undercover
sting operations, meaning that many of the decisions affecting sen-
tencing fall within the unreviewable realm of prosecutorial discre-
tion. 6  Prosecutors guiding undercover operations routinely decide
which people to target, how many opportunities for commission of the
crime to offer, the type, extent, and location of the crime, and when to
terminate the operation.87 Undercover field officers with little or no
guidance can make similar decisions.88 The decision to incorporate
into the undercover operation aggravating factors such as selling
crack instead of powder cocaine, selling near a school, or having fire-
arms present during the crime falls within the discretion of prosecu-
tors and field agents.89 As a consequence of such governmental influ-
ence of sentencing under the Guidelines, numerous examples of gov-
ernmental manipulation of sentencing have reached the courts.
In United States v. Cannon,90 an undercover agent posing as an
illegal gun seller met with the defendants who were drug dealers.
The defendants had stated that they wanted to purchase five hand-
guns. Along with an assortment of handguns, the agent brought two
machine guns to the meeting. Initially, the defendants purchased
only three handguns, but after some salesmanship by the agent they
purchased one of the machine guns.91 The relevant statute imposed a
five year mandatory sentence for the defendants' purchase of the
Id. at 966-967 (footnote omitted).
The shift in sentencing discretion left Judge Edwards to question "whether the Guidelines,
in transferring discretion from the district judge to the prosecutor, have not left the fox
guarding the chicken coop of sentencing uniformity." Id. at 965 n.5. For additional commentary
on this subject, see Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to
Disparity, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 161, 189-200 (1991) (discussing numerous ways in which
prosecutorial discretion can create sentencing disparities).
84. Yellen, 78 Minn. L. Rev. at 452-53 (cited in note 72).
85. Id. at 453.
86. Saul M. Pilchen, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Undercover Sting Operations:
A Defense Perspective, 4 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 115, 115 (1991).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 886 F. Supp. 705 (D.N.D. 1995). The court held that the government's conduct was
both sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation and that the "tainted conduct" would,
therefore, be excluded from consideration at sentencing. Id. at 709.
91. Id. at 706-07.
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handguns but increased the mandatory sentence to thirty years for
buying the machine gun.92
Similarly, in narcotics stings, the government manipulates
sentences by persuading suspects to buy amounts large enough to
trigger a statutory minimum, even if the suspect is unable to afford or
acquire that quantity.93 Agents may postpone arrest until the suspect
has purchased an aggregate quantity that will ensure the statutory
minimum penalty.94 The government also manipulates sentences by
selling drugs at a reduced price,95 or by delivering more drugs to the
defendant than he purchased.96 Such practices can inflate the drug
quantities associated with the defendant, distorting his sentence so
that it is disproportionate to the defendant's actual culpability.97 In
United States v. Rosen,98 the suspect negotiated, paid for, and
expected to receive only thirty pounds of marijuana. Instead, the
undercover agent loaded 150 pounds into the suspect's car. The extra
120 pounds added thirty months to the defendant's sentence. 99
Because criminal penalties are more stringent for dealing
crack cocaine than for dealing powder cocaine, agents who agree to
buy powder cocaine may later demand that the suspect convert the
powder into crack. 100 This is accomplished in minutes by heating the
powder in a microwave oven, but the conversion adds years to a de-
fendant's sentence.101
92. Id.
93. Heaney, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 195 (cited in note 83).
94. Id.
95. See, for example, United States v. Sivils, 960 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1992), where the
defendant was told that he would receive approximately 1.1 pounds of cocaine (498.96 grams)
for $15,000. The undercover law enforcement officers then decided to "sell" the defendant an
entire kilogram, over double the amount originally specified, for the same price. With the
recent amendment to the Guidelines, Amend. Application Note to § 2D1.1, 486 (cited and
quoted in note 29), this form of manipulation should become less of a problem. The amendment
allows the court to depart downward from the Guideline sentence if the defendant bought more
of a controlled substance because the government agent set the price below market value. See
also note 29.
96. See, for example, United States v. Rosen, 929 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1991) where
undercover officers loaded the defendant's car with five times more marijuana than the
defendant paid for and anticipated receiving.
97. Heaney, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 196 (cited in note 83).
98. 929 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 843.
100. See United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 111 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that
sentence entrapment or sentence manipulation would act to exclude evidence of dealing crack
from the calculation of the sentence).
101. Id. at 106.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Sentence manipulation also appears in money crimes such as
bribery and money laundering. In United States v. Connell,102 a Rhode
Island stockbroker agreed to launder money for an undercover
agent.1 3 At first, the agent claimed that the money came from a gam-
bling operation in Atlantic City. After three episodes of money laun-
dering, the agent told the defendant that the money was from the
drug trade. The defendant continued to launder the money. The
court adjusted the defendant's sentence upward by five levels pursu-
ant to the Guidelines, which called for a five-level increase in cases
where the defendant knew or believed that the funds were criminally
derived. 10 4 The defendant claimed that the agent created the tale
about the illicit origin of the funds solely to guarantee that the defen-
dant's sentence would be increased. The defendant believed that he
was too far into the money laundering scheme to stop and that his
knowledge of the money's origin placed him in danger should he re-
fuse to cooperate.
Notwithstanding these abuses, no circuit court had agreed to
reduce a sentence because of governmental manipulation. When
presented with the Staufer case, however, the Ninth Circuit took a
different tack. As a result, in Staufer, the Ninth Circuit became the
first federal circuit court to hold that a court could depart from the
Guidelines-mandated sentence based on the theory of sentence en-
trapment.105
IV. ENTRAPMENT GENERALLY
Undercover operations that set traps for unwary criminals are
essential for policing consensual crimes such as drug dealing and
prostitution. These crimes are covert and generally do not produce a
"victim" who will provide the police with information. The only way
for the police to gain evidence about the crime is to involve themselves
in the criminal enterprise. Sometimes, however, this involvement can
rise to the level of creating crime that would not otherwise occur.
When a court finds that law enforcement has wandered from its
102. 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992).
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id.
105. As noted earlier in this Note, the district court in Barth, 788 F. Supp. at 1055, was the
first court to depart from the Guidelines based on sentence entrapment, but its decision was
overturned on appeal. 990 F.2d at 422. Since the Staufer decision, the District Court of North
Dakota has also departed from the Guideline sentence based on sentence entrapment. Cannon,
886 F. Supp. at 705.
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proper function of preventing crime to manufacturing crime, the court
can step in by recognizing the entrapment defense.106
In Sorrells v. United States,0 7 the Supreme Court developed
the entrapment doctrine for the federal courts. The Court meant for
entrapment to be used as a defense for those unfairly trapped by an
undercover investigation in which the government participated in the
crime.108 Under the test, the threshold question is whether the
government encouraged the defendant to commit a criminal act.10 9 If
so, then the Sorrells majority would apply a subjective analysis and
ask whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.11O
If, under this subjective approach, a court finds that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime, then the entrapment defense is
unavailable.", If, however, the court finds that the defendant was not
predisposed, then the court will hold that the defendant was
entrapped, and the defendant is not liable for the crime.112 The Court
justified its creation of the entrapment doctrine by explaining that
Congress in drafting its criminal statutes could not have intended to
punish the "otherwise innocent" who were led to crime by government
agents."3 Subsequent opinions make it clear that the focus of the
entrapment defense is the question of the defendant's guilt, not the
police misconduct."1
106. Judge Posner explains why the courts defend against governmental efforts to induce
people to commit crimes they would otherwise not commit:
[T~he proper use of the criminal law in a liberal society is to regulate potentially harmful
conduct for the protection of society, rather than to purify minds and to perfect
character. A person who would not commit a crime unless induced to do so by the
government is not a threat to society and the criminal law has no proper concern with
him, however evil his thoughts or deficient his character.
United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1993).
107. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
108. Id. at 445.
109. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1963).
110. Id.
111. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1975) (stating that the "petitioner's
conceded predisposition rendered [the entrapment] defense unavailable to him'.
112. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445.
113. Id. at 448-49 ("We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in
enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the
instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order
to lure them to its commission and to punish them. We are not forced by the letter to do vio-
lence to the spirit and purpose of the statute"). See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372
(1958) ('The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime).
114. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488.
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The concurring opinion in Sorrells, authored by Justice
Roberts, adopted an objective test for determining entrapment. 115 The
concurrence found that a defendant is entrapped only if the methods
used would likely induce an "ordinary law abiding citizen" to commit
the offense. 116 This test focuses on the propriety of the government's
conduct while ignoring the defendant's predisposition. 117 Justice
Roberts based this test on the public policy of protecting the integrity
of the judicial process. 118 Later opinions favoring the objective test
have emphasized other public policy goals such as the deterrence of
unlawful police conduct and the need to give guidance in regulating
police conduct."m
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the entrapment
defense is not based on the Constitution.120 Therefore, different juris-
dictions may choose whether to adopt the defense and which version
to adopt.121 The Federal Government and a majority of the states
follow the subjective approach as consistently articulated by the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court.122 The objective approach is steadily
gaining adherents and has been adopted by the Model Penal Code 123
and by many states, through both judicial decisions and legislative
pronouncements.124
Although the entrapment defense is not constitutionally re-
quired,125 a number of Justices have recognized a separate fifth
115. 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 458-59.
117. Id.
118. Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 209(b) at 513 (West, 1984).
119. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ('The courts refuse to convict
an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute,
but because ... the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction
cannot be countenanced'). See Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 209(b)at 513 (cited in note
118) (explaining the difference between objective and subjective entrapment).
120. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973) ("Since the defense is not of a
constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question and adopt any substantive
definition of the defense that it may find desirable').
121. See Scott C. Paton, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It" A Proposed Approach to
Entrapment under Jacobson v. United States, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 995, 1000-06 (1994) (discussing
the subjective and objective approaches and noting hybrid approaches developed by various
states).
122. Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire after Jacobson v. United States: Towards a
More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1055, 1063 (1993).
123. Model Penal Code § 2.13 (ALI, 1985).
124. For example, the objective approach was adopted by judicial decision in Massachusetts
in Commonwealth v. Harvard, 253 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1969), and in Michigan in People v.
Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1973), and by legislative acts in New York in N.Y Penal Law §
40.05 (McKinney, 1987), in Illinois in Ill. Rev. Stat § 720ILCS 517-12 (1992), and in Texas in
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.06 (West, 1974). Commentators also overwhelmingly favor the
objective approach. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 689 (1979).
125. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
212
1996] SENTENCE ENTRAPMENT 213
amendment due process defense to outrageous governmental behav-
ior.126 The test for a due process violation is whether the actions of
government officers violated those standards "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."'127 Unlike subjective entrapment, the due process
defense focuses entirely on the government's behavior. 128 In applying
the due process defense, federal courts have followed the Court's
advice in United States v. Russell1 29 that due process is a defense only
against the most outrageous governmental behavior. Courts,
therefore, have construed this defense very narrowly. 13° For example,
in United States v. Simpson,13' the FBI persuaded a woman to offer
sexual favors to the defendant in order to lure him into selling drugs.
The court found this "very unsavory" but held that the due process
defense did not apply.132 Although the due process defense and
objective entrapment are similar in that they both focus on police
conduct rather than the defendant's predisposition, due process
appears to apply to only the most extreme misconduct, while objective
entrapment has a broader application. 133
126. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that Russell and
earlier entrapment defense cases might prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant in the
face of outrageous police behavior); Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (noting that "[wie may some day
be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction").
127. Palko u. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
128. See Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the
Law Enforcement Justification, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 745, 760 (1992) (observing that an
entrapment defense is available under Russell to a defendant who is not predisposed to commit
the crime at issue, and may even be available when the defendant is predisposed to the com-
mission of such a crime).
129. 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973).
130. In fact, in Hampton, a three justice plurality stated that no such defense exists.
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th
Cir. 1994), held that the due process defense against police over-reaching is invalid.
131. 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987)
132. Id. at 1465.
133. As the court noted in United States v. Jannotti: "It is plain from the Court's opinion in
Russell and the separate opinions in Hampton, however, that a successful due process defense
must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which goes beyond that necessary to
sustain an entrapment defense." United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3rd Cir.).
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V. ENTRAPMENT AS APPLIED TO GOVERNMENTAL MANIPULATION OF
SENTENCING
The status of entrapment theory as applied to manipulation of
sentencing is still unsettled. The First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuitss4
all endorse some form of the theory, the Eleventh Circuit"35 has explic-
itly rejected the theory, and the rest of the circuits remain undecided.
The courts that endorse the theory or are undecided have further split
according to how the theory should be conceptualized. This split over
the correct form of sentence entrapment follows the split over general
entrapment. Some courts articulate a subjective test, some an
objective test, and others a due process test.
The four courts that to date have upheld a claim of sentence
entrapment range throughout the spectrum of entrapment theory.
The Staufer court applied a subjective test and focused on whether
the defendant was predisposed to deal the larger amount of LSD
demanded by the government agent.136 The district court in Barth
applied an objective test and focused entirely on the conduct of the
government agents. 37 The district courts in Cannon and Shepherd
applied both the subjective and objective tests, with the objective test
closely resembling the due process defense. 38 Both courts held that
they could exclude evidence from the sentence calculation based on
the government's manipulative behavior. 39
The sentence entrapment claim was first proposed in the
Eighth Circuit and took the subjective form.40 Now, most courts,
including the First,4' Fourth,142 Seventh,143 and Eighth44 Circuits rec-
134. Connell, 960 F.2d at 196; Barth, 990 F.2d at 425; Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1108.
135. United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
136. 38 F.3d at 1108.
137. 788 F. Supp. at 1057-58. The court stated that it declined to resolve whether the
defendant was predisposed to make the drug transactions. Instead, the court focused on the
perseverance of the agents in engaging in sufficient transactions to place the defendant within a
mandatory minimum sentence. Id.
As noted above, this holding was overturned on appeal by the Eighth Circuit, which held
that the test should be subjective and should be focused on the defendant's predisposition. The
court held that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and that, therefore, the
district court should not have departed from the Guideline sentence.
138. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 709; Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 111.
139. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 708; Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 112.
140. See United States v. Lenefsty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) ('We are not
prepared to say there is no such animal as 'sentencing entrapment.' Where outrageous official
conduct overcomes the will of an individual predisposed only to dealing in small quantities, this
contention might bear fruit').
141. Connell, 960 F.2d at 194.
142. United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994).
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ognize at least two distinct claims. The first, sentence entrapment, is
based on a predisposition test like that articulated by the majority on
the Supreme Court in defining subjective entrapment. 145 Sentence
entrapment occurs when the government improperly causes a defen-
dant to commit a more serious offense than he would otherwise have
been predisposed to commit.146 The test focuses on whether the
defendant is really "guilty" of committing the crime at the higher level
and, therefore, whether he deserves the stronger punishment.
Sentence manipulation, the second claim, is based on an objective test
emphasizing police conduct. 47 Sentence manipulation occurs when
the government engages in improper conduct that has the effect of in-
creasing a defendant's sentence.148 The claim is essentially a means
for the court to establish a code of conduct for undercover investiga-
tions and guard against behavior aimed solely at increasing a defen-
dant's sentence. 14 9 Most courts agree that the label "sentence entrap-
ment" cannot accurately apply to a test that focuses on governmental
conduct because the essential aspect of the entrapment defense as
articulated by the majority on the Supreme Court is the defendant's
lack of predisposition to commit the crime. 50
Shepherd and Cannon, the two cases that have upheld claims
of sentence manipulation, based their decisions on the existence of
governmental behavior that served no other purpose than to enhance
the sentence. 15' Often, undercover agents will continue to purchase
drugs long after they have enough evidence to convict the dealer
143. United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994). The Cotts court recognized
the distinction between sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation, but expressed
trepidation about the recognition of sentence manipulation as a valid legal claim: "[Ilt is not
clear to us what the precise legal objection to governmental behavior based on cognizance of
relative penal consequences in this area could be (so long as it does not rise to the level of true
entrapment)." Id.
144. United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993).
145. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
146. United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995).
147. See Connell, 960 F.2d at 194 (differentiating between sentence entrapment and sen-
tence manipulation). See also Shepherd, 4 F.3d at 649 (stating that "the argument is more
appropriately referred to as sentence 'manipulation', since its focus is not on whether petitioner
was predisposed to commit the crime, but instead on whether the DEA stretched out the
investigation merely to increase the sentence"). But see United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28,
31 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that "[wihen an accusation of sentencing factor manipulation
surfaces, the judicial gaze should, in the usual case, focus primarily-though not exclusively-on
the government's conduct and motives" (emphasis added)).
148. Okey, 47 F.3d at 240.
149. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 707.
150. Jones, 18 F.3d at 1152-53.
151. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 110-11; Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 708-09.
2151996]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
because they are trying to gain evidence against those higher up in
the organization. 152 This technique adds years to the dealer's sentence
since the Guidelines aggregate the separate transactions, but it is an
accepted practice because it has a legitimate investigatory goal.153 In
contrast, asking a defendant to convert powder cocaine to crack once
he has already agreed to sell the officer the drug does not help the
officer's investigation. It merely adds time to the defendant's sen-
tence.M The court in Shepherd found this manipulative purpose on
the part of the officer sufficient to support the defendant's claim of
sentence manipulation and excluded the tainted transaction from
consideration at sentencing.155
The courts are also split over whether to recognize two
versions of the sentence manipulation claim with one version corre-
sponding to objective entrapment and the other to the due process
defense. The Fourth Circuit defines sentence manipulation in due
process terms, making the claims one in the same. 156 The district
courts in Cannon157 and Shepherd 58 also use due process language
when discussing the sentence manipulation claim. However, because
these courts both found that the defense was valid and because the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have indicated that the due
process defense is extremely disfavored or non-existent, Shepherd and
Cannon probably did not apply a true due process defense.
The First Circuit in Connell hinted that a claim of sentence
manipulation exists apart from a due process claim and that the
sentence manipulation claim applies to behavior that does not rise to
the level of a due process violation.159 The Seventh Circuit also
recognizes a difference between sentence manipulation and the due
process claim, although the validity of the non-due process version of
sentence manipulation is in question.16°
152. See, for example, Barth, 788 F. Supp. at 1058, in which the agent explained that after
the fourth buy his main purpose in continuing to buy was "to get to the source."
153. See Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 110.
154. Id. at 110-11.
155. Id.
156. Jones, 18 F.3d. at 1153 (stating that sentence manipulation is "outrageous government
conduct that offends due process").
157. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 707.
158. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. at 110-11.
159. Connell, 960 F.2d at 194 (holding that the sentence manipulation defense "requires us
to consider whether the manipulation inherent in a sting operation, even if insufficiently
oppressive to support an entrapment defense.., or [a] due process claim ... must sometimes be
filtered out of the sentencing calculus").
160. Okey, 47 F.3d at 240 (quoting Cotts, 14 F.3d at 306 n.2) ("If we are willing to accept the
assumption apparently approved by Congress that [for example] dealing in greater quantities of
drugs is a greater evil, it is not clear to us what the precise legal objection to governmental
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In sum, when a defendant is faced with governmental
manipulation of his sentence, he can make at least two, possibly
three, distinct claims in arguing that a court should depart from the
Guidelines or exclude evidence that would enhance his sentence. He
can claim (1) sentence entrapment, which is essentially the
descendant of subjective entrapment, (2) sentence manipulation in the
form of objective entrapment, or (3) sentence manipulation in the
form of the due process defense. The question remains as to which of
the three tests-subjective, objective, or due process-is best suited to
the sentencing context in light of the different policies underlying
these tests.
VI. ANALYSIS OF ENTRAPMENT THEORY APPLIED TO GOVERNMENTAL
MANIPULATION OF SENTENCING
A. Staufer Revisited
The court in Staufer relied on sentence entrapment to depart
from the Guidelines.11 In applying the test for sentence entrapment,
the court focused on the defendant's predisposition.162 The court
avoided much discussion of the theory underlying this claim, relying
instead on a weak statutory interpretation argument to support its
departure. Staufer's statutory interpretation provides a poor founda-
tion for departure based on governmental manipulation of sentencing.
To better justify such departure, courts must grapple with the policies
underlying sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation and base
their departure on the strength of these policies.
The Commission amended the Guidelines to allow departure in
the specific situation of manipulation of sentencing accomplished
when government agents sell drugs at below-market prices.63 The
court in Staufer argued that this amendment was proof that the
Commission had considered the general problem of governmental ma-
nipulation of sentencing in undercover operations, had disapproved of
behavior based on cognizance of relative penal consequences in this area could be (so long as it
does not rise to the level of true entrapment or [outrageous government] conduct)"). See United
States v. Muthana, 60 F.3d 1217, 1225 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing sentence manipulation
from due process claims).
161. 38 F.3d at 1107.
162. Id.
163. Amend. Application Note to § 2D1.1, $ 486 (cited in note 29).
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such conduct, and had "expressly recognized" that courts could take
into consideration the defendant's predisposition to deal in the quan-
tity for which he was convicted. 16 The amendment asks whether the
defendant's "available resources would have allowed him to purchase
[the drugs].."165 This language could arguably suggest the subjective
predisposition test because the amount of money carried by a drug
purchaser would be useful information in determining how much that
person intended to buy.
The amendment, however, could just as easily be seen to advo-
cate an objective test. The amendment makes no mention of words
such as predisposition or intent that would indicate a subjective
analysis.166 Instead it asks whether the government set an artificially
low price. 67 This seems to suggest a focus on the government's con-
duct and, therefore, an objective test.
Because the amendment supports either test, the court in
Staufer was incorrect to conclude that the Commission "expressly
recognized" that courts should examine a defendant's predisposition.
Therefore, this amendment is poor support for a departure from the
Guidelines based on the subjective claim of sentence entrapment.
Based on the statutory language, the Commission does not favor one
test over the other.16
The court in Staufer interpreted the Commission's condemna-
tion of this one manipulative practice as evidence that the
Commission had considered the general problem of manipulation and
was condemning all manipulation of sentencing in undercover opera-
tions.169 If this were the case, one would expect the amendment to
have been written more broadly to cover more than just one particular
form of manipulation. If anything, focusing on such a narrow range of
manipulative behavior suggests either that the Commission has not
considered manipulation in general, or that it has considered
manipulation in general and has purposely limited departure to this
one instance, prohibiting by implication departure in other instances
of manipulation. Either way, the Staufer court was wrong to
interpret the amendment as a general condemnation of manipulative
sentencing.
164. 38 F.3d at 1107.
165. Amend. Application Note to § 2D1.1, T 486 (cited in note 29).
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 38 F.3d at 1107 (noting that "[als [the] Amendment illustrates, the Sentencing
Commission now expressly recognizes that law enforcement agents should not be allowed to
structure sting operations in such a way as to maximize the sentences imposed on defendants').
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Because the amendment is so unclear both as to whether it
supports departure based on other forms of manipulation, as well as
to whether departure should be based on the subjective sentence en-
trapment theory, Staufer bases its sentence entrapment departure on
the weakest of foundations. Courts wishing to depart from the
Guidelines based on manipulation of sentencing must build a better
foundation for such departures if they intend to be upheld on appeal.
The best starting point for this foundation lies in the policy
underlying the three different claims of governmental manipulation of
sentencing.
B. Sentence Manipulation-The Claim Best Suited to
the Sentencing Context
Subjective entrapment in the form of sentence entrapment
does not provide a sound basis for departure. The claim of subjective
entrapment was developed for deciding guilt or innocence, not for
adjusting sentences. 170  The decision regarding guilt or innocence
involves different policies than does sentencing. Therefore, the
subjective entrapment defense, developed for use in the former
context, is ill-suited for use in the latter.
The Supreme Court has developed its entrapment theories
solely in the context of determining guilt.171 Commentators have
pointed out that in its entrapment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
actually applies a balancing test rather than the pure predisposition
test it purports to use. 72 As evidence, consider that courts only allow
those who were induced by a government agent to claim entrap-
ment. 73 However, whether a defendant is induced by an agent or by
someone else, his predisposition to commit the crime is exactly the
same. 74 Since the Court treats these two scenarios differently, the
Court must be looking at something other than culpability in distin-
guishing between those induced by the government and those induced
by private parties. 75
170. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445 (adopting the subjective entrapment defense to
conviction). For more discussion, see notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
171. See notes 107-19 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
validity of the entrapment claim in the sentencing context.
172. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 209(b) at 513-16 (cited in note 118).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 515.
175. Id. at 513.
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Instead of applying a pure predisposition test, the Supreme
Court balances the goal of punishing the guilty against deterring
police misconduct. 176 With its focus on police activity, the objective
test is the logical choice if the goal is deterrence of police misconduct.
The subjective test, which focuses on the guilt or predisposition of the
defendant, is the logical choice if the concern is to ensure convictions
of guilty parties. In choosing the subjective test over the objective
test, the Supreme Court has made a policy choice in favor of convict-
ing the guilty at the expense of deterring police misconduct.
This choice, however, was made for entrapment applied at
trial, not at sentencing.' 77 At trial a successful defense of entrapment
sets the defendant free.178 This is not the case with entrapment ap-
plied to sentencing. At sentencing, a successful sentence entrapment
or sentence manipulation claim will not release anyone from custody.
It will simply result in a sentence better tailored to the defendant's
culpability. Therefore, the major reason in the trial context to choose
a subjective sentence entrapment test over an objective test-concern
about setting a guilty party free-does not apply in the sentencing
context. Because one of the primary reasons for choosing the
subjective test does not apply in the sentencing context, the balance
should tilt in favor of applying an objective test in this context.
Another problem with the subjective version of sentence en-
trapment is that it presents a difficult proof problem. In evaluating
entrapment at trial, the judge must distinguish between those who
were predisposed to commit a crime and those who were not. This
presents a difficult analysis. 179 To prove sentence entrapment, the
judge must draw an even finer distinction between predisposition to
commit the crime at one level and predisposition to commit it at
another. The judge will have difficulty discerning how much of the
drug the defendant originally wanted to buy, or how much of a defen-
dant's decision to buy a particular amount of drugs resulted from the
encouragement of the government agent. Therefore, a clear distinc-
tion between what the defendant was predisposed to do and what he
176. See id. at 514 (describing the divisions between members of the Court concerning the
competing considerations of criminal predisposition of the defendant and unconscionable police
conduct in an examination of sentence entrapment).
177. The Supreme Court has only ruled on entrapment as a defense to conviction. The
Court chose the subjective test in this context. See, for example, Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445.
178. Jeffrey W. Kiak, Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 Wash. U. L.
Q. 199, 217 (1981).
179. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992) (holding that the
government failed to establish the petitioner's predisposition to commit the crime for which he
was convicted, thus necessitating a reversal of his conviction).
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actually did will only become apparent in an extreme case where the
government's behavior is outrageous and stands in sharp contrast to
the behavior of the defendant. This makes the subjective version of
entrapment useful in counteracting only the most egregious govern-
mental behavior.
The goal of courts should be to create a practical defense to
governmental manipulation of sentencing that courts can then use on
a regular basis to curb the excesses caused by the Guidelines.
Subjective entrapment does not effectively meet this goal. As
evidence, consider that only one court in one case has upheld a
defense of governmental manipulation of sentencing that was based
solely on the subjective test, yet courts have had numerous opportuni-
ties to address the claim. 180 To combat anything less than truly out-
rageous manipulation, courts must adopt an objective test.
Further evidence that an objective test is the better defense is
that sentence manipulation closely resembles the exclusionary rule,
which is endorsed by the Supreme Court. The exclusionary rule is
used to exclude evidence at trial that was seized in violation of the
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments.181 Like an objective test applied
at sentencing, the exclusionary rule is an objective test that focuses
on police conduct.182 Just as the objective test at sentencing excludes
tainted evidence from the calculation of a sentence, the exclusionary
rule excludes tainted evidence from the trial.
Public policy should favor an objective test applied at
sentencing at least as strongly as it supports the exclusionary rule. In
imposing the exclusionary rule, courts deter coercive police conduct
related to gathering evidence for trial. 83 In excluding evidence from
sentencing based on an objective test, the court would deter coercive
police conduct affecting sentencing. The determination of guilt is a
very important decision, but deciding whether to sentence someone
180. Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1108. The other three cases that have upheld claims of sentence
entrapment either applied an objective test (Barth), or held that sentence entrapment applied in
the alternative to sentence manipulation (Cannon, Shepherd).
181. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
398 (1914). See also Klak, 59 Wash. U. L. Q. at 217-18 & n.23 (cited in note 178) (comparing
sentence entrapment to the exculsionary rule).
182. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-57 (focusing upon the conduct of the government for the
exclusionary rule determination).
183. See id. at 656 (noting that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it' "). See also Klak, 59 Wash. U. L. Q. at 218 n.123 (cited in note 178)
(observing that "the exclusionary rule results only in the exclusion of the tainted evidence at the
trial'.
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for five or for thirty years is equally significant.18 The difference be-
tween the two rules is that excluding a key piece of evidence, such as
a confession, at trial, often will affect whether the court convicts or
acquits the defendant, while excluding evidence at sentencing only
affects the extent of the defendant's punishment. Therefore, while the
exclusionary rule and an objective test applied at sentencing both
protect important goals-fairness at trial and fairness at
sentencing-the exclusionary rule has the large potential cost of
setting a guilty party free.185 An objective test at sentencing does not
share this cost. Since courts uphold the exclusionary rule despite this
cost, courts should do the same for an objective test applied at
sentencing.
In adopting an objective test, courts could choose either
sentence manipulation in the due process form or sentence
manipulation in the less demanding objective entrapment form. Both
tests avoid the problems of the subjective test. Basing the test on
objective entrapment rather than due process will allow a court to
reach police behavior that does not rise to the level of outrageous
conduct necessary to support the due process claim.186 Also, appellate
courts may be more lenient in reviewing departures based on objective
entrapment than those based on due process. Rarely have the courts
of appeals upheld due process entrapment claims, and the Supreme
Court has never found due process violated in an entrapment case.
187
The Sixth Circuit absolutely rejects the claim as does a plurality of
the Supreme Court. 188 Furthermore, there is a logical flaw in arguing
184. See Cannon, 886 F. Supp. at 707 (indicating the disparity in sentencing that can result
from the practice of sentence manipulation).
185. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (discussing the necessity of setting some criminals free in
order to maintain the sanctity of the judicial process).
186. See Connell, 960 F.2d at 194. The Court in Connell seems to distinguish between the
severity of behavior necessary to satisfy sentence manipulation and that which will satisfy a due
process defense. See note 159.
187. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 (rejecting the defendant's claim of entrapment based on
due process and rejecting the idea that entrapment rests on a constitutional basis); Hampton,
425 U.S. at 485-91 (illustrating a plurality of the Court again rejecting the due process claim for
a predisposed defendant). For federal courts of appeals cases denying claims of entrapment
based on due process, see Owen v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that "the government participation alleged here falls far short of the extremely outrageous and
shocking conduct necessary to establish a due process violation"); United States v. Walther, 867
F.2d 1334, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding no due process violation where the government
initiated negotiations, provided the location for the transaction, transported the narcotics, and
supplied the narcotics); United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 962 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
due process was not violated even though the undercover agent tried to scare the defendants
into purchasing marijuana by throwing a violent temper tantrum).
188. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d
1420, 1421 (6th Cir. 1994).
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for a reduction in a sentence based on a violation of the Due Process
Clause. The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Walls'8 9 explained that if
the governmental conduct was not so outrageous as to support a due
process claim at the conviction stage, then the same conduct cannot
give rise to a due process claim at the sentencing stage. In short, a
valid conviction presupposes that there is no due process violation.
Therefore, a convicted person cannot argue later that a due process
violation should be grounds for a sentence reduction190 Clearly,
objective entrapment is a better basis than due process for the claim
of sentence manipulation.
VII. OTHER SOLUTIONS: How THEY COMPARE TO SENTENCE
MANIPULATION
While sentence manipulation is the best judicial solution to
governmental manipulation of sentencing, it is not the only solution.
Because the source of manipulation of sentencing is the Guidelines,
the problem of manipulation could be addressed by changing the
Guidelines.
Constitutional challenges to the Guidelines have been tried
and have failed. Mistretta v. United States held that the creation of
the Sentencing Commission did not violate separation of powers prin-
ciples.191 Due process claims have also been unsuccessful, with the
federal courts of appeals holding that non-individualized sentencing
does not violate due process. 192
Congress could change the basic structure of the Guidelines by
shifting the emphasis away from harm and quantity, and back to ju-
dicial discretion. More judicial discretion would reduce manipulation
by the government and reduce this source of disparity in sentences,
but it would also lead back to the original source of dispar-
ity--different judges giving different sentences. The solution lies not
in fundamentally altering the Guidelines and changing the roles of
the different actors in the sentencing system. Instead, the Guidelines
should be fine-tuned to compensate for governmental manipulation.
The Guidelines were designed to be an evolutionary system
with the Commission acting as a permanent body that could revise
189. 70 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
190. Id.
191. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
192. See, for example, United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1989).
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the Guidelines as needed. 193 The Commission should perform this
function and revise the Guidelines to compensate for manipulation of
sentencing. The Commission could create additional amendments
similar to the one cited in Staufer to provide a separate departure for
every conceivable form of manipulation. This, however, would be a
daunting task, and those who experienced forms of manipulation that
the Commission had not identified would still be left without a
remedy. Ideally, the Commission should amend the Guidelines to
provide a departure based on sentence manipulation, broadly defined
as "egregious governmental behavior aimed solely at increasing the
severity of a sentence and serving no valid investigatory purpose."
The Commission should leave it up to the courts to create a common
law of what specific behavior constitutes sentence manipulation. This
would return some discretion to judges but only in a narrow area.
Furthermore, since departures are subject to appellate review for
reasonableness, this discretion would be held in check and would
therefore not lead back to the kind of disparity existing before the
Guidelines.
The executive branch could also address the problem. The
Attorney General could produce regulations governing undercover
investigations and could proscribe the specific tactics that United
States Attorneys and agents use to manipulate sentencing.194
However, the inherent conflict of interest in leaving prosecutors and
agents, who have a career interest in successfully fighting crime, to
guard the interests of defendants will not afford defendants the best
protection.
One commentator has argued that such regulations should be
directed at prosecutors because prosecutors have an ethical duty to do
justice195 However, if prosecutors always adhered to their ethical
duties, the problem of manipulation would not exist in the first place.
While regulations governing prosecutors and law enforcement agents
may cut down on some manipulation, those with a conflict of interest
should not be relied upon to protect the interests of others.
Regardless of which other solutions are enacted, sentence
manipulation should play a role. If the Commission amends the
Guidelines, it should make general sentence manipulation a ground
for departure. If, instead, the Commission targets particular forms of
manipulation, sentence manipulation should still play a role as a
193. See Breyer, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 41) (documenting the creation of the
Federal Sentencing Commission).
194. Underhill, 1994 Ann. Surv. Am. L. at 198-200 (cited in note 83).
195. Id. at 197.
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defense for those who experience manipulation that does not fit into
one of the Commission's categories for departure. If the executive
branch tries to regulate its own behavior, sentence manipulation
should act as a backstop when conflicts of interest cause the regula-
tions to fail.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Guidelines mark an enormous change in federal court
sentencing practices. This change brings new opportunities for abuse
and disparity in treatment. One of these abuses is governmental
manipulation of sentencing. Departure from the Guidelines or
exclusion of evidence from sentencing based on the sentence manipu-
lation theory provides the best solution to the problem of
governmental manipulation of sentencing.
Robert S. Johnson
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